The Professional Responsibility of Teachers of Professional Responsibility by Shaffer, Thomas L.
University of Baltimore Law Forum
Volume 14
Number 1 Fall, 1983 Article 4
1983
The Professional Responsibility of Teachers of
Professional Responsibility
Thomas L. Shaffer
University of Notre Dame - The Law School
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf
Part of the Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Forum by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information,
please contact snolan@ubalt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Shaffer, Thomas L. (1983) "The Professional Responsibility of Teachers of Professional Responsibility," University of Baltimore Law
Forum: Vol. 14: No. 1, Article 4.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf/vol14/iss1/4
6 
THE PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF 
TEACHERS OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 
The Agenda 
I am making a moral claim: the re-
quired law school course called Profes-
sional Responsibility should be ethics.1 It 
should not be the study of the legal reg-
ulation of lawyers. Ethics is not a system 
of regulation; it is a discipline that studies, 
debates, and reasons over morals. 
It is important to be stubborn about the 
claim that we should teach legal ethics 
as ethics and not as law. It is important, 
first of all, because lawyers in America 
resist legal ethics. They want and have 
always wanted to shove ethics off the track 
and talk about law instead.2 The homily 
therefore tends to become the regulation, 
even when it is an interesting homily and 
even when lawyers could benefit from 
studying the homily as a homily and not 
as a regulation. Our subject should be 
good morals in the practice of law. 
Our method should be a conversation 
with our students on good morals. When 
we talk about morals, we need not speak 
ex cathedra nor need we whisper. We 
should be able, as Socrates was, to sub-
mit morals to reason without coercion. 
Thus the first part of my claim is to insist 
on ethics, taught in this non-coercive way, 
as a legitimate subject in law school. 
This claim that legal ethics be ethics is 
fundamentally conservative. It has tradi-
tion on its side. American legal ethics be-
gan early in the nineteenth century as 
ethics in an almost pure form. It began 
as discourse between law teachers and 
students-not in courts or bar associa-
tions, but in law schools. 3 As the country's 
moral consensus disintegrated in the 
middle of the nineteenth century, legal 
ethics became a system for the collective 
disapproval, and then the exclusion, of 
deviants. It then became a subject for bar 
associations and courts,4 but that is not 
where it started. 
The development toward regulation and 
away from ethics has now reached the 
point where many American lawyers feel 
that instruction in professional responsi-
bility ought to be limited to legal regula-
tion-and that the morals of lawyers, as 
lawyers, should be excluded from what 
the profession has to say about the re-
sponsibility of its members.s That position 
is, to some extent, a linear development 
from the founding of bar associations in 
the 1870's, but it is also evidence of the 
dimming in America of a clear idea of 
what a lawyer should do or be. 6 If one 
wants to reason over the development, 
however, its beginning and its situation 
are fairly clear: 
• Discussion of what a lawyer should 
do or be, in America, begins in the 
nineteenth century with admoni-
tions to law students; admonitions 
that are largely and expressly mo-
ral admonitions. Absent from these 
admonitions is the implicit threat that 
lawyers who fall short will be brought 
before the professional fraternity or 
before the community and adver-
tently sanctioned for misbehavior.7 
• Modern proposals on professional 
responsibility excise such moral 
admonitions from professional 
consensus.s Proponents obviously 
include those who would limit 
professional responsibility to legal 
regulation,9 and they also include 
those who phrase their proposals 
in principles argued in terms of what 
the profession expects of its mem-
bers and what the community ex-
pects of the profession. Those 
whose ethical arguments are fra-
ternal or social or civil are talking 
more about regulation than about 
ethics.1O They do not answer, or 
propose to answer, the question 
Professor Monroe Freeman once 
put as whether a good person can 
be an American lawyer.11 
The distinctions behind such modern 
proposals for what are called legal ethics 
are troublesome in many ways, because 
there does seem to be a difference be-
tween saying to a naughty child, "It is 
wrong to turn the garden hose on your 
grandmother," and, "If you turn the gar-
den hose on your grandmother, you're 
going to be in trouble." I am suggesting 
a moral argument for the first kind of 
statement and therefore for legal ethics. 
We should be talking about: 
• What an American lawyer should 
do. 
• What an American lawyer should 
be. 
• And whether it is possible in Amer-
ica to be a good person and a law-
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yer-and if so, about how that is 
possible.12 
That should be our agenda. Our duty to 
make it our agenda is the primary moral 
obligation we have to our students. Law 
remains relevant material, of course, but 
the student of legal ethics finds law in-
teresting more as an expression of mo-
rals than as an expression of when coer-
cion is appropriate. 
The Cultural and Personal 
Context 
The study of legal ethics preserves in 
university legal education an ancient dis-
cipline. It preserves the study of morals 
as that subject is of interest in philosophy 
and theology in the university. It aims to 
locate and weigh the roots of both be-
havior and admonition, but it is unique 
among university subjects in that it is both 
a cultural and a personal discipline: 
• Cultural in the sense that it in-
cludes virtually every corner in our 
civilization, from the Greek philos-
ophers to the biblical Hebrews to 
the Church. It should feel comfort-
able in consulting thinkers from Au-
gustine to Maimonides, Aquinas to 
Karl Barth, John Calvin and Martin 
Luther to the Niebuhrs and Martin 
Buber, all of these as well as Hoff-
man, Sharswood, and Drinker. 
• Personal in the sense that one ac-
counts for himself and examines 
himself when he studies morals. 
That is always a necessary part of 
the ethical agenda. Legal ethics 
should discuss morals in a person-
ally relevant way, but we should 
also consider morals as Thomas 
More said we should consider law, 
"in the tangle of [the] mind";13 that 
is with the discipline and rigor and 
civility with which we American 
lawyers study in law school the rule 
against perpetuities or the First 
Amendment. There is no logical or 
psychological inconsistency in being 
both personal and rigorous. 14 
American law teaching pretends 
that there is an inconsistency be-
tween compassion and rigor, but 
American law teaching is wrong-
in all senses of wrong.15 
Legal ethics is in part a consideration 
of the conversation between Socrates and 
Thrasymachus (in which Socrates told 
Thrasymachus that the two of them would 
discover justice in the way they treated 
one another).16 Legal ethics is also in part 
a consideration of such moments as this 
one between a colleague of mine and me, 
as we stand before the magazine rack in 
the faculty lounge: 
Colleague: (pointing to the current 
Sports Illustrated) 
You know they give in 
there, about Earl 
Campbell, the highest 
praise you can give a 
Texan. 
I: Oh? What is that? 
Colleague: They say he had a good 
mama. 
Earl Campbell's good mama is personal 
to Earl Campbell, as each of our mamas 
is personal to each of us, and she is a 
major part of what I mean by culture. It 
is our task not to leave her out of account, 
even if the price of taking her into account 
is a reduced prominence for cases and 
codes.17 I am talking about a large agenda, 
and I am arrogantly insisting that it is a 
moral agenda for us. I am not analogizing 
the syllabus here to the syllabus in Prop-
erty One and to the choice between pre-
ferring estates in land to landlord-tenant 
law. I am talking about a required course 
having to do with what an American law-
yer should do or be. I am claiming that it 
is morally irresponsible to approach legal 
ethics in the same way that we approach 
what to delete from Property One. 
Socrates' dialogue on justice provides 
a better analogy than Property One. Soc-
rates says: (1) We are going to figure 
out, as thinking people, what justice is; 
(2) We are going to begin with the as-
sumption that justice is a virtue-some-
thing that causes people to give to one 
another; and (3) We will notice that part 
of figuring out what justice is will be to 
notice the way we treat one another as 
we talk. 18 Justice is both an interesting 
subject and a gift we give to one an-
other.19 Therefore, two different moral 
claims are being made. 
The first moral claim, one that applies 
to all teaching, is that we should treat 
students as persons. Students are, to use 
Justice Wilson's phrase in Chisholm v. 
Georgia,20 the noblest work of God. It is 
immoral to mistreat them, to use Student 
A as merely the occasion of Student B's 
learning, or Student B as merely the oc-
casion of a clever joke for the benefit of 
all present. 21 This first moral claim has a 
consequential professional specification: 
it is from law teachers that students learn 
how to treat clients. 
The second moral claim is that morals, 
not law, should be our subject. This sec-
ond claim is not satisfied by merely treat-
ing students with respect as we talk with 
them about law. The intellectual subject 
matter of our course should be morals, 
not law, in that this subject matter will 
inevitably involve issues of personal sig-
nificance for us and for our students. One 
of my students asked, after class, "Hey, 
are you trying to influence our behavior?" 
The answer was yes. Of course. Nothing 
less. 
There ~re limits. Legal ethics is only 
part of ethiCS, and part of the study of any 
sub-discipline is to consider it in a dis-
crete way. Our subject involves what a 
lawyer should do or be as a lawyer. This 
agenda, this jurisdiction, is specific but by 
no means narrow. It can be claimed, and 
it has been claimed by American lawyers 
that being a lawyer is a way to be a good 
person.22 More often, however, lawyers 
make the more modest claim that a good 
person can be an American lawyer. The 
latter moral claim is that the lawyer part 
of a person does not destroy goodness; 
for example, the goodness that is there 
because the lawyer had a good mama. 
If you think of the subject in terms of 
such claims, legal ethics is pure ethics. It 
asks a dispositiona/23 question, the sort 
of pervasive moral question H.R. Niebuhr 
asked: "What am I up to?"24 It focuses 
the question professionally. It looks at 
moral behavior when (a) another person 
is involved, and (b) that other person is 
a client. It focuses the general ethical 
question by asking not only, "What am I 
up to?" but also, "What am I up to in this 
other person's life?,,25 or, "How is he 
changing because of me?" These ques-
tions have two levels. The immediate level 
is, for us teachers, "What am I up to in 
this student's life?" or, "How is this stu-
dent changing because of me?" 
It is because of this vicarious focus that 
professional ethics takes an interest in 
questions of whether a lawyer should lie, 
an accountant cheat, a physician kill, or 
a law teacher abuse one student for the 
benefit of other students. Those ques-
tions are not as interesting when the fo-
cus is whether a person should do those 
things in his own behalf. They are inter-
esting in professional ethics because they 
are being considered in reference to the 
welfare or benefit of a client. For example, 
if I ask you whether I should lie in court, 
you will very likely tell me that I should 
not. If I ask you if I should take advantage 
of the poor and ignorant, cheat widows, 
or pollute the lake, you will likely tell me 
that I should not. Professional ethics takes 
its interest not in questions such as these, 
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but in questions about being of profes-
sional assistance to people who see rea-
sons, often good reasons, to do those 
things.26 
Professor Harry W. Jones put the issue 
this way: 
[O]ne of the best men I have ever 
known, my Sunday School teacher 
of many years ago, who was at once 
a vastly successful practicing lawyer 
and a person of stiffly uncompromis-
ing personal rectitude, whom I ad-
mired and whose memory I still re-
vere. " How could he have 
accommodated his keen sense of 
justice to the partisan ethics of the 
profession he thought of as his life's 
vocation?27 
Professor Jones then finds it interest-
ing to ask whether his Sunday School 
teacher would have helped a person who 
had been indicted for violent crime and 
who had doubtless done what he was 
charged with doing. If the answer to that 
is yes, he wonders if the Sunday School 
teacher would be willing to conceal in-
criminating evidence or to cast the shadow 
of guilt on an innocent person. Such 
questions become interesting because 
they involve a client. They would be less 
interesting if they involved concealment 
and false accusation by the Sunday School 
teacher in his own behalf. 
This vicarious or substitutional focus 
provides two kinds of tension: (a) be-
tween (i) the morals a lawyer displays in 
his life with neighbors and friends and (ii) 
the morals of his client; and (b) between 
a lawyer's morals and his sense of public 
and professional duty. Those tensions are 
topical in the classroom. Students are 
aware of them and also feel them. They 
are evident in the development of Amer-
ican legal ethics as well. Consider, for 
example, Chief Justice Roger Brooke Ta-
ney, who had been Attorney General of 
Maryland before he became a judge. Ta-
ney had argued, as counsel in Brown v. 
Maryland,28 a position he rejected, as 
judge, in the License Cases29 of 1847. 
There was to his nineteenth century 
gentleman's conscience an inconsis-
tency between telling a court, as advo-
cate, that the law ought to be one way, 
and then later deciding, as judge, that it 
ought to be the other way: 
I argued the case in behalf of the 
State and endeavored to maintain that 
the law of Maryland, which required 
the importer, as well as other deal-
ers, to take out a license, before he 
could sell and for which he was to 
pay a certain sum to the State, was 
valid and constitutional and, cer-
tainly, I at that time persuaded myself 
that I was right and thought the de-
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clslon of the Court restricted the 
powers of the State, more than a 
sound construction of the Constitu-
tion of the United States would war-
rant. But further and more mature re-
flection has convinced me that the 
rule laid down by the Supreme Court 
is a just and safe one; and perhaps 
the best that could have been 
adopted, for preserving the right of 
the United States, on the one hand, 
and of the States, on the other, and 
preventing collision between them. 
The question, I have already said, 
was a very difficult one .... 30 
Why difficult? Why is the inconsistent be-
havior even noticed? Would a modern 
American judge feel so tender about not 
following as judge a position he has urged 
as a legal rule when he was employed to 
be an advocate for a client?31 If not, what 
has changed? If these questions are in-
teresting, it seems important that they be 
discussed in both of the contexts already 
suggested, both the cultural context and 
the personal context.32 
American-Lawyer Hero 
Stories as Teaching Tools 
My method in looking at legal ethics 
includes the study of American lawyer-
hero stories. This method is a useful way 
to help students keep track of both the 
cultural and the personal in the study of 
morals. I am claiming that we teachers 
should, as a matter of our own sound 
morals, use these devices. With these 
stories, I find it useful, in a familiar aca-
demic way, to divide the stories and the 
points of view in the stories into five over-
lapping categories. 
The Legal Ethics of Gentlemen says 
that it is possible to be a good person and 
an American lawyer and that the way to 
do it is to be a gentleman. A doctrinal 
focus for that point of view is in the "Res-
olutions on Professional Deportment;' 33 
written by Baltimore's David Hoffman, the 
founder of American legal ethics. Hoff-
man (1774-1854) was a Baltimore law-
yer and a colleague at the Bar of Taney. 
Most of the American lawyer-heroes in 
fiction are gentlemen who hold this 
gentleman's point of view; e.g. Atticus 
Finch of To Kill a Mockingbird34 or Wil-
liam Faulkner's lawyer, Gavin Stevens.35 
Sometimes they have a certain Jeffer-
sonian bombast about them that seems 
to say the prosperous are bound to be 
good, and sometimes they accept the 
gentleman's advantages of status and 
wealth as a circumstance that carries mo-
ral burdens not borne by those who are 
not gentlemen. I find that teaching the 
ethics of gentlemen is indispensable to 
an adequate account of what an Ameri-
can lawyer is. I also find serious personal 
tensions for students in this indispensa-
ble moral pOint of view, especially among 
women students. American ladies share 
the moral point of view of American 
gentlemen but, even so, ladies are not 
quite gentlemen.36 
When I am successful in respecting both 
the personal and the cultural in legal eth-
ics, I notice a certain tension between the 
picture of the paternalistic American 
gentleman-lawyer and our egalitarian 
ideals. (It was deTocquevilie who noticed 
that the lawyers of America are natural 
aristocrats.)37 That tension has a cultural 
cast; Faulkner's Gavin Stevens, lawyer-
gentleman from Mississippi, says that he 
protects the weak, including those who 
are not even weak.38 It also has a per-
sonal cast; our students are, or are not, 
being treated like children at our hands, 
and they are, or are not, learning from 
us how to treat their clients as child-
ren. 39 These are, at both levels, moral 
questions: they are not matters of taste 
or of law. Protecting the weak was, among 
other things, the Southern gentleman-
lawyer's way of excusing racism; it is the 
modern lawyer's way of excusing the fact 
that his clients become more, not less, 
competent when they deal with him. 
The Legal Ethics of the Two King-
doms says that it is possible to be a good 
person and an American lawyer and that 
the way to do it is to separate one's per-
sonal morals from one's professional mo-
rals. 40 This point of view says that it is 
possible to be a good lawyer and a good 
person too, but rarely the twain shall meet. 
The purest doctrinal expression of this 
point of view in American legal ethics is 
the development of the adversary ethic 
in the late nineteenth century.41 The ad-
versary ethic says that it is selfish and 
immoral to refuse to do for clients what 
clients want done. Modern lawyer-heroes 
often represent this point of view (for ex-
ample George V. Higgins' Boston crimi-
nal defense lawyer Jerry Kennedy42), but 
the moral argument has ancient roots. My 
way of naming it is borrowed from Martin 
Luther.43 Students have personal ten-
sions here, too. It is difficult for many of 
them to figure out a way to live bifurcated 
moral lives, and it is almost always un-
satisfactory to answer that bifurcation is 
what the legal system requires of them. 
The Legal Ethics of Principle says that 
the way to be a good person and a lawyer 
is to locate and adhere to sound moral 
principles, such as Kant's universals, or 
the Golden Rule, or the principle that says 
a lawyer should maintain independent 
professional judgment in working with his 
client.44 Sir Thomas More, an English 
lawyer, was a man of principle. He gained 
renown as an American lawyer-hero when 
Robert Bolt's play "A Man for All Sea-
sons" became popular in this country in 
the 1960's. Hoffman's Resolutions are al-
most all moral principles (he was fond of 
maxims), and so are the greater parts of 
the earliest codes of legal ethics, such as 
Judge Thomas Goode Jones' 1887 Ala-
bama code,45 and the 1908 American Bar 
Association Canons.46 More did not go to 
his death saying that martyrdom is a 
gentleman's lot: he went announcing three 
principles; the legal principle that silence 
is not treason, the moral principle that one 
should not take an oath falsely, and the 
religious principle that the King of Eng-
land could not be the head of the Church.47 
He also went to his death with Significant 
self-deception about what was going on 
in England.48 Part of his self-deception 
was the notion that principles were an 
adequate way to describe his moral life. 49 
The comparison of the gentleman-law-
yer's ethic and the legal ethics of the two 
kingdoms suggests an ancient contrast 
between virtues and principles as being 
most significant in morals, a contrast be-
tween being good and being right,50 a 
contrast between Aristotle,51 who did not 
announce principles, and most modern 
philosophical ethics and jurisprudence, 
which rarely announces anything else. 52 
The difference is between accounting for 
morals with the Scout Handbook, which 
talks about bravery, cheerfulness, hon-
esty, and loyalty, instead of the Code of 
Professional Responsibility, which is a set 
of rules. 
This difference is subtle at first, but it 
is real and it is important. When you get 
going on it in class, you are doing nothing 
less than putting Earl Campbell's mama 
back into legal ethics. You are discov-
ering the fact that there is important moral 
material in our lives that is deeper and 
more explanatory than principles and that 
we come to see something as a moral 
problem because of this deeper material. 
The most interesting moments in ethics 
deal not with right versus wrong, but with 
right versus right; not with which moral 
rules you follow, but with how you live 
with all the moral rules you are supposed 
to follow.53 Aristotle understood that; so 
did Atticus Finch; so should teachers of 
legal ethics. 
Professional Legal Ethics finds moral 
authority in the profession itself. Judge 
(Dean) George Sharswood's 1854 essay 
on legal ethics54 invoked the morals of 
the fraternity. Sharswood, who was a 
magnificently clubbable man, told his 
students that they would not go wrong if 
they sought in everything the approval of 
their profeSSional elders. This pOint of view 
is prominent in the modern lawyer stories 
of Louis Auchincloss55 and James Gould 
Cozzens. It is this notion that led to the 
founding of the first American bar asso-
ciations. It, too, has ancient roots. The 
earliest hero stories in the West are sto-
ries of warriors and adventurers who did 
well with what they were given to do.56 
Modern students are familiar with the mo-
rality that calls on them to imitate their 
elders, but they are also familiar with Wa-
tergate, security frauds, and the murky 
characters that hang around the police 
courts looking for legal business. George 
V. Higgins' Jerry Kennedy is a lucid ob-
seNer of this contrast. Students who can 
stand his foul language love him. 
The Legal Ethics of the Dissenter, the 
rebel, is a persistent strain in the Amer-
ican profession; that is noticeable in the 
"vulgar bar" of urban stories, in the fron-
tier profession in America, and among 
lawyers who find unbearable elitism in bar 
associations and among gentlemen. 
Ephraim Tut!, lawyer-hero of more than 
a hundred short stories in The Saturday 
Evening Post, is a twentieth century ex-
ample of this point of view, as are Higgins' 
Jerry Kennedy and the wonderful, real-
life Fanny Holtzmann.57 These lawyers 
seem to believe, and sometimes say, that 
the way to be a good person and a lawyer 
is to ignore what prosperous lawyers say 
to do. In a more positive analysis, their 
morals are likely to be personal and cul-
tural; they refuse to make a morality out 
of procedures such as the adversary ethic. 
They make the useful point that a client 
is a person before he is a moral problem. 
Some of them see the law as a means 
to social change. They talk, as Charles 
Morgan does, not of law and order but of 
law against order.58 
Each of these five pOints of view is 
embedded deep within American culture 
and, I think, deep within ourselves. These 
points of view are not proposed for study 
as if they were party platforms, each ex-
clusive of the others. I find that lawyers 
in American stories usually teach us from 
more than one point of view. Tut!, for ex-
ample, is both a gentleman and a rebe!. 
Kennedy is both a rebel and a lawyer who 
tries to separate his profession from the 
rest of his life. 
Quandary Ethics, or "What 
Would You Do?" 
How does one talk about such moral 
points of view? The most universal method 
in legal education, and especially in the 
study of professional responsibility, is to 
talk in quandaries. Our penchant for the 
study of cases in law carries over into a 
preference for cases in morals, and so 
we present a dilemma and say, "What 
would you do?" This method is attractive 
and probably unaVOidable, but it is lim-
ited. 
For one thing, the case method over-
looks the fact that a quandary becomes 
a quandary because of morals. Morals 
may solve quandaries but, before that, 
they create quandaries. Jean-Paul Sartre 
presents the case of the World War II 
French patriot who is the sole support of 
his mother: should he leave home and 
join the Free French Army, or stay at home 
and care for his mother?59 There would 
be no quandary if the man in the story 
had not learned, somewhere, to love his 
country-and not only his country but a 
particular view of what his country is. There 
would be no quandary if he had not 
learned, somewhere, to love his mother, 
and not only to love her, but to express 
his love in a particular way. Sartre uses 
the story to make the existentialist claim 
that our morals are the product of our 
choices; they are morals only because we 
choose to make them so. 
The maternalistic lawyer who has as a 
client a teenager in trouble in juvenile court 
may have a quandary between doing for 
her client what she thinks best for him 
and doing for her client what her client 
wants done: her client wants to be re-
stored to his colleagues in the alley. The 
state boys' school would dry him out and 
teach him a trade. Procedural notions point 
in one direction; the wisdom-such as it 
is-of a culture that imposes values on 
children, as any culture does, inevitably 
points in another direction. But the quan-
dary will not be there if mama-knows-best 
lawyer morality is strong enough to over-
come the law school acculturation of free 
choice and due process. (Atticus Finch, 
of To Kill a Mockingbird, was a remark-
ably paternalistic lawyer, but Atticus never 
went to law schoo!.) The quandary would 
not be there if moral, not legal, notions of 
civil liberty were strong and the deter-
mination to protect the weak were not as 
strong as the model American-Iawyer-
gentleman makes it. One who discusses 
morals in the context of a quandary needs 
to know what he is doing, and what he is 
not doing. 
For another thing, quandary ethics has 
in it, and especially in law school, an ex-
istentialist bias. It tends to equate one's 
morals with one's taste in beer.60 It tends 
to make a fetish of tolerance and to avoid 
intellectual rigor. In a characteristic dis-
play of this, one of us presents the case 
of the maternalistic lawyer and the teen-
ager, and then directs argument over it 
for a while, and then moves on to the next 
quandary. We do not evaluate the moral 
arguments our students make. It is not 
true that every point of view in ethics is 
as valuable as every other point of view. 
Part of our moral duty to our students is 
to make them think about morals. If the 
topic of dis.cussion were covenants-run-
ning-with-the-Iand, we would see that in 
a moment. The First Resolution in Spen-
cer's Case,61 that a tenant's convenant 
to build a bridge cannot benefit a suc-
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cessor owner of the land, is a silly rule, 
and the discussion in property class will 
not go on long before someone notices 
and describes the silliness. The general 
attitude among property teachers is that 
such judgment and analysis must occur 
or students will never learn to think like 
lawyers. Quandary ethics in law school is 
weak primarily because it does not in-
volve the intellectual rigor of our property 
courses. For some reason, possibly be-
cause values are often religious and 
Americans have the anti-intellectual no-
tion that it is not civil to argue about re-
ligion, we do not analyze and debate mo-
ral notions with the openness and 
discipline we bring to legal notions. Quan-
daries make it too comfortable for us to 
lead our students on a little hike through 
a field of moral brambles and to think we 
have taught them something. 
Finally, quandaries hide people. Quan-
daries are too abstract. It is probably the 
case that no one would retain his clarity 
on the answer to an abstract moral quan-
dary, such as Sartre's Free French ex-
ample or the juvenile court case, after he 
gets to know the people involved. For this 
reason, I find it useful to read and think 
and talk about stories. Stories display 
morals more than announce them. They 
involve quandaries, but they put quan-
daries in a narrative, human context. The 
context cuts the quandary down to size. 
A story helps give the quandary an ap-
propriate amount of weight, that is, the 
weight it has in life. 
There are no doubt other teaching de-
vices for making the point that clients are 
the noblest works of God. The best of 
these devices is to treat students as stu-
dents should treat clients. The goal in us-
ing any such device is to show that in the 
practice of law, as in any other human 
activity, the moral life is a life that involves 
pain and tragedy, which is to say that the 
moral life is not possible unless we are 
willing to, as they say, let others suffer for 
our principles.62 Our duty is to teach that 
good morals amorrg lawyers matter, and 
that means that good morals among law-
yers, and among teachers of lawyers, are 
expensive.63 
* Thomas L. Shaffer is the Director of Francis 
Lewis Law Center at the Washington and 
Lee University School of Law and an author 
of several books, including On Being a 
Christian and a Lawyer. 
~ Comprehensive footnotes prepared by Pro-
fessor Shaffer contain citations and textual 
material. They are available on request by 
writing to the author at Washington and Lee 
School of Law, LeXington, Virginia 24450. 
